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THE CHALLENGES OF CONSCIENCE IN A
WORLD OF COMPROMISE
AMY J. SEPINWALL

The process of crafting and passing legislation might be thought
to be the locus of compromise par excellence. 1 Yet, where the law
that results impinges upon moral or religious belief or practice,
the issue of compromise arises anew, in both senses of the word:
Individuals who oppose the law on moral or religious grounds
believe that their political obedience will compromise them in a
fundamental way. Their plea for an exemption from the objectionable legal requirement is, then, a bid for further compromise. 2
Compromise in the first sense concerns an undercutting of the
self, while compromise in the second sense involves a grant of
concessions. Yet, unlike compromises that arise in the legislative
process, or at least in some ideal version of it, 3 the compromise
involved in an exemption from a neutral law of general application involves neither an exchange of benefits nor the prospect of
mutual benefit-two hallmarks of compromise in, say, political
(and other) negotiations. 4 There are several reasons to doubt the
wisdom or fairness of the requested exemptions, then.
First, why should government confer a "private right to ignore
[a] generally applicable law[] "? 5 Further, why defer to conscience
at all? The claims of conscience compel from a first-person perspective; they have no hold over anyone but their bearer. And
there is no necessary connection between these claims and moral
truth-one might be just as gripped by a conscience dictating
virtue as one demanding vice. Worse still, where the exemption
would impose burdens on third parties, accommodating his claims
220
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of conscience threatens not just political obedience but oppression
of others too. Finally, if compromise embodies the best of politics,
as at least some theorists contend, then conscientious exemptions
might well embody its worst-instances of favoritism that offend
against commitments to neutrality and equality too.
These are all concerns that would support significant restrictions on the exercise of conscientious objection, or perhaps its
elimination altogether, as some theorists have proposed. 6 In this
chapter, I seek to defend robust rights of conscientious objection,
first by arguing in favor of a highly, though not completely, deferential stance toward pleas for accommodations on conscientious
grounds, and then by taking up in turn the challenges lodged
against granting conscientious exemptions.
I frame the discussion through the challenges and requests for
accommodations that have been raised in response to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), focusing in particular on the employer mandate-the legal requirement that
employers with 50 or more employees provide health insurance
that meets a minimum set of standards. 7 Among these standards
are rules requiring coverage for women's healthcare, including
all 20 FDA-approved methods of contraception. 8 The most prominent challenge to the contraceptive coverage requirement-the
so-called contraceptive mandate-is the one the US Supreme
Court decided on the last day of its 2013 term, in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby. 9 Hobby Lobby is a closely held corporation owned by a family of evangelical Christians who object, on religious grounds, to
the use of certain forms of contraception. The PPACA's employer
mandate required that Hobby Lobby's insurance package provide
coverage for these forms of contraception, but the Supreme Court
held that this requirement substantially and unnecessarily burdened the family's freedom of religion, and that of its corporation
by extension. As a result of the decision, Hobby Lobby was permitted to exclude contraceptive coverage from its employee healthcare plan. 10
Challenges to the employer mandate involve three features that
render them especially difficult, and so fruitful, for an inquiry into
the place of conscientious objection within a democratic polity. First,
these cases turn upon an atypical conception of complicity. In the
standard case of conscientious objection, the objector seeks to avoid
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having to participate directly in conduct he deems wrong. Paradigmatically, pacifists seek to avoid fighting in a war. But the employer
mandate cases involve complicity in an asserted wrong that occurs at
a far greater remove: The employer claims that simply by subsidizing an insurance package through which his employees access medical interventions he deems wrong, he is complicit in their wrongsand indeed complicit enough, he thinks, for him to warrant an
exemption. Historically, courts have denied pleas for exemptions
where the objector's connection to the conduct he believes wrong
is attenuated in the way that the employer's is. Thus, those opposed
to war may not withhold the portion of their tax burden meant to
fund the military, 11 and those opposed to abortion may not withhold
that portion of their university fees that fund campus health services
where the health services provide abortions or abortion counseling.12 Hobby Lobby marked a shift from these cases. Recognizing complicity through subsidization, as Hobby Lobby does, opens the door to
a whole host of opt-outs, with potentially vast implications for much
of our regulatory regime.
The second challenging, and so illuminating, feature of the
employer mandate cases is that the exemptions sought threaten to
impose costs upon third parties. If employers are released, on conscientious grounds, from their obligation to cover certain forms of
healthcare, their employees will have to secure subsidization for,
or provision of, the excluded drugs or treatment elsewhere, possibly at their own expense and inconvenience. Historically, however,
cases of religious accommodation have involved claimants who
have wanted to be left alone; they have not sought to impose their
convictions, or the implications of their convictions, on others. 13
In this way, the employer mandate cases raise issues that courts
have not yet had significant occasion to think through. 14 As such,
these cases invite us to work out the appropriate balance between
the employers' interests in purity of conscience and the material
(and perhaps also expressive) costs of being denied what is otherwise a statutory entitlement.
Finally, the employer mandate challenges exemplify a kind of
conscientious objection that is especially threatening to democratic politics. The typical case for an accommodation involves a
claimant pressing a marginal religious or moral commitment, and
an exemption can be granted to him with little or no disruption to
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anyone else, and so no worries about government partiality. Thus,
when we permit Native Americans to use peyote (an otherwise
illegal drug) in their religious ceremonies, we can congratulate
ourselves on our benevolence and cultural sensitivity. 15 When we
honor the pacifist employee's objection to manufacturing tanks
even though he evidenced no objection to manufacturing the
steel used to make these tanks, we can celebrate our deference
and humility. 16 In both cases, accommodation implicates no one
else's legitimate interests. But when the government faces a conflict between respecting religious freedom and women's reproductive rights, any outcome it pursues threatens an intolerable favoritism. This conflict is perhaps the most vexing (and belabored) one
in the literature on democratic disagreement. The employer challenges to contraceptive provision crystallize the conflict and allow
us, perhaps, to see a way out.
I aim in the first part of the chapter to defend a qualified, albeit
quite deferential, stance on conscientious accommodation. But
that does not mean that we should offer exemptions to all comers. The second half of the chapter explores limits to the presumptively deferential exemption regime that the first part defends.
In sum, the aspiration here is to find a balance-a suitable
compromise-between claims of conscience and the foundational
commitments of a liberal democracy. The outcomes at which I
arrive may not find widespread favor among political liberals, but
I believe that they maintain faith with the spirit of political liberalism nonetheless.

l.

CONSCIENCE AND ACCOMMODATION

A. Defining and Defending Conscience

Thomas Hill defines "conscience" as "a capacity, commonly attributed to most human beings, to sense or immediately discern that
what he or she has done, or is about to do (or not do) is wrong,
bad, and worthy of disapproval." 17 This definition seems overly cognitive, however. For one thing, conscience is more than mere judgment, or the formation of a belief that something is "wrong, bad,
and worthy of disapproval." 18 Ifl have not internalized a particular
moral prohibition-if I have no conviction in regard to it-I may
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well know that an act I have done, or am about to do, is wrong and
worthy of disapproval and yet feel no compunction about it. That
is, it forms no part of my conscience. Further, if I have internalized
the prohibition, then my conscience is likely to elicit more than
just the belief that what I am about to do is wrong; it will also p_r~vide motivation to refrain from committing the wrong, and anticipatory guilt or fear at the prospect of doing wrong. In other words,
"conscience," as I shall understand the term, is a complex of cognitive, conative, and emotional dispositions. 19
In addition to the dispositions that conscience requires, we
should also attend to its content. The commitments constitutive
of one's conscience are those that are central to one's identity. 20
These can be non-moral (e.g., "never let the fire in one's soul
die," 21 or "may what I do flow from me like a river, no forcing and
no holding back, the way it is with children" 22 ), moral ("I will recognize the inherent dignity of all people and treat them all with
equal respect") or "I will not unjustifiably harm another"), or religious (e.g., "I will treat all human life from the moment of conception as sacred"). Moreover, each of these can be specified in a
multitude of ways. For example, "I will not cheat" is a specification
of "I will play fair" (amoral commitment).
I doubt that non-moral commitments could justify a conscientious exemption, for we do not take it to be the state's role to
facilitate our efforts at self-actualization. By contrast, moral and
religious commitments are typically other-regarding and, for good
or ill, we privilege commitments motivated by concern for others
over commitments motivated by concern for self. 23 As such, we
have more reason to exempt someone from a law binding on the
rest of us where that law conflicts with a moral or religious commitment than where it conflicts with a commitment aimed at selfactualization that does not have religion or morality as its source. 24
At any rate, since most claims for an accommodation turn on
moral or religious commitments, I do not consider non-moral
commitments further. 25 On the other hand, I follow those theorists who argue, despite much law to the contrary, that we should
be willing, where appropriate, to accommodate not just religious
claims of conscience but moral ones too. 26 I seek to elucidate, in
what follows, when and why we should conclude that these claims
should ground an accommodation.

I

To begin, one might wonder why any conscientious commitments ought to command our respect. Andrew Koppelman argues
that conscience poorly tracks the cases where we feel exemptions
should or should not be granted. 27 Thus, some claims that we are
inclined to think worthy of accommodation are not claims of conscience per se. For example, those who seek an exemption from
the ban on peyote, because peyote is used in religious ceremonies,
do not claim that their consciences mandate peyote use so much as
their religion does. On the other hand, conscience can be strongly
felt in favor of claims that we would not want to grant. Thus, Koppelman offers the rationale provided by a man who murdered his
sister-in-law and her infant daughter because, as the murderer
recounted, he received a divine command that he felt he could
not disobey. 28
The first half of Koppelman's puzzle seems readily resolved
once we note that the dictates of conscience may be specified in
a multitude of ways and the reasons we have for accommodating these dictates provide at least prima fade reason for accommodating their specifications. Thus, we allow Native Americans to
use peyote because peyote use is a central part of their religious
observance and we believe religious observance worthy of accommodation in the face of the federal drug laws.
The second half of Koppelman's puzzle, however, which turns
on the questionably moral nature of the contents of a conscience,
is more troubling. And Koppelman is not alone in noting that
claims of conscience need not track objective, or even commonly
held, moral truths. Other theorists invoke Huck Finn as the paradigmatic instance of someone whose conscience would have led
him astray had he heeded it, because he had internalized the law
of his day, and so felt deep inner turmoil about not turning Jim
in. 29 And Hannah Arendt's great and devastating insight in Eichmann in Jerusalem is precisely along these lines. She writes, "it was
not his fanaticism but his very conscience that prompted Eichmann to adopt his uncompromising attitude [i.e., his unwavering
devotion to the "final solution"] during the last year of the war." 30
Moreover, for Koppelman, it is not just that there is no reason
to expect that the dictates of anyone's conscience will be worthy
of deference but also that conscience itself-the capacity, rather
than its contents-is hardly worthy of respect. Koppelman defines
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conscience as "an imprecise word for an internal compulsion to act
that is specified only by the possessor's internal psychology. "31 Conscience, that is, is the capacity that turns one's convictionswhatever their source-into authoritative commands. But so
defined, Koppelman argues, conscience can play no compelling
role in justifying accommodations: "Neither conscience ... nor
volitional necessity necessarily points toward anything that other
people have any obligation to respect.... Perhaps it is very hard
for someone to resist the force of volitional necessity, and perhaps
that counts as a (rebuttable!) reason not to ask them to do it. But
in that case, the appropriate response is not respect. It is pity." 32 In
sum, the problem with conscience for Koppelman is that it "is
entirely unmoored from any objective value" 33 and it is heeded
automatically, and not because its possessor reflectively endorses
its commands.
Contrary to Koppelman, I believe that the process of heeding
one's conscience is not as reflexive as Koppelman contends, and
more valuable than he allows. The notion that we follow our conscience merely as a matter of compulsion fails to track both the
phenomenology of, and our discourse around, conscience. Our
most prominent experiences of conscience arise when we face a
conflict between two incompatible norms-for example, secular
law and religious conviction. There is no proceeding automatically
in the face of this conflict. If we see both as normative-if we have
adopted an "internal point of view" with respect to each 34-the
conflict will call us to attention. We will be forced to decide which
norm to follow, and the process of so doing will require that we
engage in conscious deliberation.
With that said, some people do take their claims of conscience
to be automatic trumps. Even here, however, we should not treat
reliance on conscience as a matter of brute compulsion. For the
automatic adherence to conscience would quite likely have been
preceded by a moment when the individual in question did deliberately decide that conscience would prevail. This is just the way
it is with commitments-we deliberately adopt them precisely so
that, from the moment of their adoption, they will operate for us
as non-starters: 35 To adopt a commitment is to decide once and
for all that it will function as a trump. Should a commitment be
implicated at some time thereafter, we will not need to go through
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the deliberative exercise of deciding what weight to give it, less
still whether to heed it at all. That work was done the moment
we adopted the commitment. It is efficient to proceed in this way,
but it is also appropriate to do so: What it is for something to be a
conviction is for it to preempt our considering whether it should
dictate our conduct. Having been made a conviction, it just does
dictate. Other commitments work the same way. For example, the
marriage vow, along with its commitment to fidelity, is intended to
take off the table each spouse's recurring evaluation of whether
to stay in the relationship. While the marriage is well functioning
at least, the question should not even arise; the vow short-circuits
it. And convictions are just commitments of a particular kind-as
I have already said, commitments are central to one's identity. In
sum, Koppelman is right that there is something automatic about
the exercise of conscience. But there is nothing unusual or embarrassing about the deliberative elision that conscience involves.
Turning now to the other complaint, that conscience fails to
track objective value. One can agree with those who express the
worry and yet still believe that conscience itself is intrinsically valuable. The project ofliving one's life in accordance with a set of values one chooses (or at least affirms) is a distinctive trait of persons.
Living according to one's conscience gives meaning to our lives,
making them about more than the peripeteia of everyday existence. The fact that we are meaning-creating creatures, that we can
and do play a role in shaping our life stories, is valuable in its own
right. Insofar as conscience, which again consists of our identitydefining commitments, is central to the direction our lives take, 36
it too is valuable in its own right. We can grant all of this even
while acknowledging that countervailing considerations might, at
the end of the day, mandate that we deny the conscientious objector an accommodation. The connection of conscience to self, that
is, confers a presumption in favor of claims of conscience. I shall
go on to specify the circumstances where the presumption may
be defeated. First, though, I seek to argue that conscience should
always get a thumb on the scale.
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B. Deferring to Conscience

When it comes to blaming one another for participation in, or
facilitation of, a wrong, both legal and moral practice set the necessary threshold for complicity in light of the gravity of the sanctions that a finding of complicity entails. 37 Thus, under much
domestic criminal law, for example, the predicates for complicity
are quite demanding, given the gravity of a criminal conviction.
In particular, one will be found complicit only if one shared the
perpetrator's purpose in seeing the crime completed and one at
least attempted to assist or encourage its commission. 38 More generally, the harsher the sanction, the more strongly connected one
must be to the wrong-causally and psychologically-in order for
one to be held morally or legally responsible for it. 39 In this way,
third-personal judgments of complicity-those judgments we form
about others-are both standardized and appropriately sensitive
to commonsense ideas about individual culpability.
But our first-personal complicity judgments-each of our assessments of our own culpability in another's wrong-are nowhere
near this regular, and this is so in light of three possible points of
divergence. First, in a pluralistic society like ours, there is often
widespread disagreement over what counts as a wrong. Contraceptive use is a paradigmatic case.
Second, we might disagree about the empirical facts. For example, the medical establishment rejects the Hobby Lobby owners'
belief that the four contested forms of contraception are abortifacients. This is not a dispute about whether destroying embryos is
morally permissible; it is a dispute about whether these four contraceptive devices work by destroying embryos. So it is a factual,
and not a moral, dispute.
Finally, there is a third kind of disagreement, and it is the one
of greatest relevance here-disagreement about the kind of connection one must bear to another's wrong in order for one to be
complicit in that wrong. As described above, standard moral and
legal accounts proceed with relatively demanding conceptions of
complicity. But conscientious objectors to insurance subsidization
under the PPACA, or conscientious tax resisters, operate with a
conception of complicity that is far more encompassing than the
standard account. These individuals believe that mere facilitation
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in a wrong (or in conduct they believe wrong) is sufficient to render them morally responsible for that wrong, and this is so even
if their contribution is made at several layers of remove from
the wrong. Thus, in the contraceptive mandate challenges, the
employer believes that merely by subsidizing an insurance plan
through which its employees or their dependents have access to
contraception, the employers become complicit in contraceptive
use. Even if we are prepared to allow individuals to decide for
themselves on matters of value (e.g., whether contraceptive use
is wrong), we might question why we should defer to those with
non-standard accounts when it comes to articulating the relevant
standard of complicity.
I have argued elsewhere that we should not judge the strength
of claims of conscientious objection on the basis of the strength of
the complicity claims underpinning them, for the pain the objector would experience in contributing to a wrong may be insensitive to the extent of her anticipated contribution. 40 Being made to
act against conscience produces a certain kind of pain-the pain
of a loss of integrity, or a dislocation from the self. 41 It is easy for
many of us to imagine how compelled participation in a wrong
might produce this sense of self-transgression, and yet difficult for
us to fathom how a compelled remote and minor contribution
might do so. But, from the perspective of one who holds a more
expansive view of complicity, and so more readily sees herself as
implicated in a wrong, the pain of facilitation in a wrong may be
no less than that for the person who is made, against his will, to
participate in the wrong. For example, the Quaker pacifist might
view paying taxes to fund a war as no less violative of his commitments than is fighting in that war. And what should matter for purposes of conscientious accommodation is the objector's felt sense
of complicity, not the sense of complicity we would have were we
in her shoes.
Put differently, conscience is tied up with the self, so it is ineluctably subjective. Individuals may differ with respect to how readily
their consciences are activated even where they agree on matters
of substantive morality or religion-e.g., where all the individuals
in question believe that contraceptive use is wrong. One will think
that she bears responsibility only for her own contraceptive use;
another will think she bears responsibility for any contraceptive
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use that she has facilitated, through its provision or subsidization.
But the subjective experience of both may well be the same--:--each
may think that she has done wrong in light of her connect10n to
contraceptive use, and the breach of conscience may feel equally
severe for each of them.
There are circumstances where we think the law should, all else
equal, protect individuals from having to contribute to condu~t
they deem wrong and the feelings of guilt to whic_h that contr:bution would give rise. This is the rationale for which we permit
conscientious objection to a military draft. But if the foregoing is
correct, we have no reason to think that an objection to fighting in
a war is more intrinsically compelling than is an objection to funding that war. To be sure, there may be extrinsic consideration_s _that
would justify our more readily exempting someone from military
service than from paying taxes to support a war. For example, it
may be easier to find a replacement for the conscientious objector to a draft than it would be to find alternative funds to cover all
of the tax dollars that would be withheld if we were to allow individuals to resist paying taxes for every government initiative they
oppose. I shall have more to say about when countei:vail~ng con~iderations should restrict our accommodating consoentious objections. The point for now, however, is that, looking at the obj~ctions
on their own merits, the very reasons we accommodate objectors
to the draft obtain for objectors to more remote contributions to
war, like taxes. In both cases, the objector believes that he would be
complicit in war, which the objector believes wrong. In both case~,
the objector anticipates that his complicity will viol~te some_ of his
most fundamental commitments, and so he conceives of his prospective complicity as a source of deep pain. If the experi~nce of
contributing would be the same for draftee and taxpayer ahke, we
have no reason-again, on the intrinsic merits of their claims-to
yield to the first and not the second. All else equal, each has an
equally compelling claim for accommodation.
..
The foregoing treats both military participation and mili~ary
funding as differing only in degree of contribution. But one might
contend that they are different in kind: The draftee performs the
controversial act; the taxpayer merely funds it. The same might be
said of the doctor who objects to abortion or physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and some other individual who contributes to it more
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remotely-e.g., the taxpayer who funds Medicaid abortions or the
store clerk who rings up the PAS prescription. When it comes to
complicity, the former are like principals to a crime and the latter are only accomplices. Surely this difference should make the
objection of the person who would be made to perform the objectionable act more compelling than the claim of the person who
would contribute to it more remotely, the thought would go.
I maintain, however, that it is no less tendentious to refer to the
draftee or the physician as someone who would be made to "perform" the objectionable act than it is to characterize both draftee
(or physician) and taxpayer as "contributors" or "participants."
For medical care-in particular, the decision whether to have an
abortion and especially whether to avail oneself of PAS-is typically a joint endeavor, involving physician and patient. Both are
participants in the treatment decisions. The taxpayer or pharmacy clerk contributes far less directly, to be sure. But the difference in question is just one of degree, not of kind. The point is
even clearer in the face of the two objectors to military conductthe draftee and the taxpayer. The draftee does no more than
participate in the war. Indeed, it is conceptually impossible for
any one person to wage war; instead, war is, by definition, a collective endeavor. Again, the draftee's participation is more direct
than is the taxpayer's. But again, that fact alone does not make an
objection to the draft more compelling than an objection to funding the military. And, indeed, if the law did not recognize that
different kinds of participation in a war might nonetheless lead
to reasonable feelings of complicity, it would require all pacifist
draftees to fulfill their service in noncombatant positions, rather
than exempting those who object to facilitating war from military
service altogether. That is, the fact that drafted pacifists may elect
to perform community, rather than military, service shows that
what matters is participation-including mere facilitation-and
not perpetration.
Legal and moral thinking go wrong, I have argued, in distinguishing between different instances of facilitation on the basis of
the strength of the causal connection between the objector and
the asserted wrong. But they do not restrict conscientious exemptions to those who would be made to perpetrate the asserted
wrong. Nor should they. Participation may be a matter of degree,
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but the sense of guilt may not-and indeed need not-track the
extent of one's causal involvement.
In sum, if we think that the law, at least all else equal, should
protect people from having to participate in conduct they deem
wrong, then we have reason to defer to the objector's subjective
sense of implication even if it is one we do not share. We have,
that is, presumptive reason to exempt the person who objects to
funding contraceptive use just so long as she would view funding
as a significant source of complicity in conduct she deems wrong.
With that said, the deference I urge is merely presumptive. I turn
now to the considerations that can and should defeat it, and the
policies and values that should accompany, inform, and constrain
a regime of moral or religious accommodation.

II.

CONSCIENTIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND LIBERALISM

One might grant that there is a case to be made in favor of conscientious objection and still contend that a robust exemption
regime offends against fundamental liberal values. In particular,
one might argue that such a regime conflicts with three key liberal
commitments: First, one might worry that granting exemptions is
unfair because oftentimes the exemptions will impose significant
costs on individuals who do not share the objectors' religious convictions. Second, insofar as the exemptions sought impose burdens
disproportionately on historically oppressed groups-women,
in the contraceptive mandate cases, or homosexuals in the cases
where business owners seek to deny employment or goods and
services to gays and lesbians-one might worry that exemptions
involve discrimination, and governmental complicity therein.
And, finally, one might see in an exemption regime a more widespread failure of governmental neutrality: Had the law evolved in
more neutral ways, the thought would go, there would be no need
for customized departures from it in the first place. I address each
of these worries in turn.
A. Externalizing the Costs of One's Moral or Religious Convictions

I have sought to argue that we should, all else equal, grant an
exemption from a legal requirement if adhering to it would
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contravene an individual's deeply held moral or religious convictions. But often all else is not equal. In the employer mandate context in particular, granting the employer an exemption might well
leave his employees without adequate healthcare coverage. 42 Thus,
in the cases where employers object to having to fund contraception, we would have reason to deny their bids for an exemption
if the women covered by these employer plans could then obtain
contraception only at significant cost or inconvenience to themselves. Happily, this was not the likely outcome in the Hobby Lobby
case as the Obama administration had already developed a workaround, whereby the insurance companies would offer contraception for free, and so courts could grant exemptions without imposing any costs on the plan beneficiaries. Matters would surely be
otherwise if the employer objected to life-saving treatment (e.g.,
blood transfusions, whichJehovah's Witnesses oppose), and there
was no alternative arrangement.
More generally, claims of conscience ground at most a presumption in their favor. That presumption will be defeated when
the cost of an exemption for third parties exceeds some threshold.
Just where this threshold lies is a matter for us to decide through
democratic deliberation. We need to determine together the
extent to which we value freedom of conscience, and the burdens
we are therefore willing to incur, or impose upon others, in order
to respect it. Once we have done so, we will have identified a level
of burden below which exemptions should be granted in the face
of sincere conscientious objection and beyond which exemptions
may be denied. In short, one constraint on our exemption regimes
arises in light of the material consequences an exemption might
entail for third parties.
B. Political Oppression and Animus

Even if we need not worry about third-party costs, though, one
might still find exemptions objectionable, for they look to provide
a way for individuals who lost in the democratic sphere to evade
the outcome they opposed. 43 A plea for an exemption is, in other
words, the enemy of compromise: The pleading party is unyielding, and granting him the exemption can undermine the prospect of compromise in future efforts at legislation. After all, why
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should a party dissatisfied with some proposed legal requirement
settle for a second-best version of his preferred outcome when he
can instead, as a conscientious objector, seek to evade the resulting law altogether? The worry about evasion is especially compelling where one suspects that the objectors aim not just to preserve
the purity of their souls by ensuring that they do not have a hand
in, say, facilitating contraceptive use; they aim to right this (supposed) wrong through their objections and (what they hope will
be) the ensuing denials of access. The concern, in short, is that
these moral or religious objectors intend sabotage. 44
And there is a more cynical worry still lurking in some of the
reaction to exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. On this
thought, what motivates opposition to contraceptive use is not
genuine concern for nascent human life but instead animus
against women. It is plausible to see certain efforts to restrict
access to abortion as evidence of misogyny. 45 And some commentators understand efforts to evade the contraceptive mandate in
a similar way: As Ilyse Hogue, director of NARAL, says about the
challenges, "The truth is that this is not about religious freedom,
it's about sexism, and a fear of women's sexuality." 46
The worry here is not, as it was above, about discrete third parties who bear direct consequences if the government grants an
exemption. Instead, the concerns suggest that all citizens may have
reason to feel aggrieved by the intransigence of the objectors. In
this way, these concerns should prompt us to question the viability
of a liberal democratic regime in the face of deep and widespread
division. To address these concerns, I consider in turn two possible
policy responses: (1) no exemptions; and (2) public provision.
1. No Exemptions
Given the threat of sabotage, and the difficulty in discerning the
objectors' true motivations, we might decide to grant no exemptions at all. Andrew Koppelman proposes as much when he argues
that we should not permit any exemptions if the legal requirement
from which the exemption is sought can function only with complete, or at least near-complete, compliance. 47 And this is just the
way courts have traditionally proceeded, denying religious accommodations where the requested exemptions would undermine the
system or program the legal requirement aims to support. Thus,
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courts do not permit tax evasion on religious grounds because
the tax system could not survive a multitude of exemptions. 48 So
too they have denied exemptions from Sunday closing laws on the
ground that allowing employers to close on any day they choose
would undermine the effort to grant citizens a common day of
rest. 49 In this way, Koppelman's concern about subverting the law
through a grant of too many exemptions makes sense.
At the same time, the notion that the prospect of being granted
an accommodation should turn on how many others share one's
objection has the counterintuitive consequence that widespread
opposition garners less deference than does opposition that is idiosyncratic or unusual. Because intersubjective convergence upon a
proposition is at least some evidence of the proposition's truth,
one might instead have thought that widespread opposition ought
to be more compelling than opposition voiced by a few. And, at
any rate, oppression of a significant minority is surely worse than
oppression of an insignificant one.
The problem, writ large, is that compelled employer subsidization of healthcare that includes elements about which there is
deep disagreement cannot be squared with the commitment to
neutrality underpinning liberal democratic politics, and the tensions to which the employer mandate gives rise will be felt on both
sides of the ideological spectrum.
From the perspective of the employer with conscientious objections to some of the forms of healthcare he is mandated to cover,
the difficulty is just the obverse of the problem of dirty hands: In
the classic case of dirty hands, politicians compromise themselves
in order to carry out our political will. As a result, they bear the
moral stain and suffer the transgression of self on our behalf. 50
Those who believe that contraceptive use (or other medical care
that employers are mandated to cover) is wrong might think of
the employer mandate as just the other side of the coin. Under the
mandate, the government recruits employers to subsidize contraception and thereby outsources the moral stain to them.
The government might seek to protect these employers from
having to incur this stain by allowing them to exclude contraception from their insurance plans, as the Court did in Hobby Lobby.
But excusing employers from contraceptive coverage because they
would otherwise feel implicated in a wrong involves symbolically
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denigrating women's rights. In other words, having a woman's
access to contraception turn not on her own convictions but
instead on those of her employer puts them both in a contest, and
has the government choose the victor. This is the kind of choice
that a government committed to neutrality and equality should at
all costs seek to avoid.
The exemption/no-exemption options, then, arise after we
have already made a choice-that provision of basic healthcare
will fall to private employers, rather than the government. It is
time to revisit that choice.

2. Public Provision
Given the controversy over contraception, one might well wonder why providing coverage for it should have fallen within the
employer mandate in the first place. Had the government, from
the outset, undertaken the obligation to provide contraception to
all women who needed it, the conflict between employers' conscience and employees' reproductive freedoms would have been
avoided. More generally, the government should not recruit its citizens to provide goods or services that a significant portion of the
populace opposes on conscientious grounds. Instead, providing
these goods and services should be a core government responsibility, and it should have been recognized as such during the debates
over the PPACA.
It would be naive to overlook the role that special interests played
in defeating a public option, under which government would have
competed with private insurance companies for healthcare subscribers.51 We can anticipate that these interests would work even
more strenuously to impede a regime under which government
was the only game in town, even if government played the role of
sole provider for only some, but not all, of the healthcare coverage
individuals might seek. For good or ill, however, I am concerned
here only with the principled merits of government contraceptive
provision, not with its political feasibility. After all, if government
provision is indefensible on the merits, then we need not worry
about whether it could be implemented in practice. In any event,
the issue of government healthcare provision-for contraception
or other medical care-is largely illustrative. The discussion that
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follows should illuminate more generally the appropriate role of
government in issues around which there is deep disagreement.
One might worry that having government, rather than private
employers, provide coverage for contraception does not so much
resolve complicity concerns as displace them. For employers who
oppose contraception might have just as much reason to object to
having to fund it through taxation as through insurance subsidization. In fact, however, I believe that concerns about complicity
through taxation are more easily met.
For one thing, the government might be able to provide contraception without relying on tax dollars at all. For example, in
an effort to develop a work-around for religious non-profit institutions that object to contraception, the Obama administration
convinced insurance companies to offer contraception at no cost
either to the religious non-profits or their plan beneficiaries. Insurers were amenable to footing the bill because the costs to them of
complications arising from unintended pregnancies are far more
significant than the cost of contraception itself. 52
Moreover, even if the government must draw on the public fisc
to provide contraception, there are still principled reasons for
thinking complicity claims less compelling here than in the insurance subsidization context. The relevant line of argument draws
upon liberal egalitarian responses to libertarian arguments against
taxation. 53 Briefly put: It is reasonable to see a commitment to distributive justice as immanent in our tax scheme; in particular, our
tax scheme aims to mitigate or eradicate the effect of brute luck,
and it does so by claiming, as a matter of right, a portion of the
earnings of those who are favored, through pure good luck, by
features of our social and economic arrangements. As such, one's
tax burden consists, at least in part, of money one has earned in
fulfillment of one's obligations of justice to compensate those who
are disadvantaged in our scheme. Since the money used to cover
this part of one's tax burden is not, and never was, one's own, one
cannot say that handing it over to the government connects one
to conduct one deems wrong. Covering the costs of female contraception can be seen as part of a redistributive scheme. By some
lights, structural injustices make it the case that women are all too
disempowered with respect to deciding whether they will have
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sex at all. 54 At any rate, women currently bear disproportionate
healthcare costs resulting from unwanted pregnancies, and disproportionate childcare burdens. On this way of understanding the
objectives of a tax scheme, then, the person who objects to contraceptive use has no legitimate complicity claim against taxation
used to cover others' contraceptive costs. In particular, he cannot
argue that using tax dollars to cover contraception forces him to
spend his money on a wrong since the money was never his in the
first place. 55
Further, even if one rejects the liberal egalitarian rationale for
taxation, there is still a practical distinction between taxation and
subsidization: Taxation, we have seen, is not subject to an exemption on conscientious grounds because the system would collapse
were such exemptions to be granted. So, even if one concludes
that the conscientious objector's complaint is strong, it is not one
to which a court can yield. And the notion that the objector loses
not on the merits but instead on practical grounds should serve to
undercut concerns about government partiality. 56
In short, the contraceptive mandate challenges expose the limits
of both compromise and conscientious objection. The concerns of
those who object to funding contraception do not admit of compromise; reducing the amount these employers contribute will not
mitigate their concerns. And exempting them altogether might
implicate the government in an expressive harm, at least where it
is animus that motivates the objectors. As such, government provision might well be the most defensible response. Making contraceptive provision a government responsibility in the first instance
would both allow those who object to contraception to maintain
clean, or at least cleaner, hands, and would ensure universal access
to it under an exemption-free regime. While expanding the government's role in women's reproductive choices might not be the
obvious liberal solution, it is, I believe, the one that most maintains
fidelity with the foundational core of our political morality.
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were·universally respected and all men were of a disposition to affirm it,
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the world we have").
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26. For support for the idea that the law should not distinguish between moral and religious convictions when it comes to exemptions, see,
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Douglas Nejaime and Reva B. Siegel, "Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics," 124 Yale Law Journal 2516,
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men"); Ruth Rosen, "The War Against Contraception: 'Women Must Be
Liberated from Their Libidios,"' HuffingtonPost, February 19, 2014.
47. Andrew Koppelman, "Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and
the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law," 88 Southern California Law Review
619 (2015).
48. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (stating that
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(1982) and Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) as support).
49. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
50. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2 (1973): 160-180.
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see Helen A. Halpin and Peter Harbage, "The Origins and Demise of the
Public Option," Health Affairs 29 (6):June 2010, pp. 1117-1124.
52. "Good for Business: Covering Contraceptive Care Without CostSharing Is Cost-Neutral or Even Saves Money," Guttmacher,July 16, 2014.
53. The libertarian objection is given voice in, for example, Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 169.
The liberal egalitarian response can be found, for example, in Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, "Taxes, Redistribution, and Public Provision,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 30(1): 53-71, 53-54 (2001) ("Taxes do not
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54. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe
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55. There is another way to understand the objectives of the tax system:
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distributive understanding), we pay taxes at least in part to fund public
goods, costs for which are shared among all taxpayers, even if not every
taxpayer benefits from every public good. The idea here is that it is efficient for taxpayers to pool their money and to use the resulting funds
to pay for all public goods, instead of having the government operate on
a pay-as-you-use system. See generally Arye L. Hillman, Public Finance and
Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government, 2d edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Even though (at least currently) healthcare plans contemplate only
female (and not male) contraceptives, it is not undue to consider coverage of these devices a public good. For one thing, contraception is
needed only for heterosexual sex, so these devices protect both the men
and women who want to have non-procreative sex. And there is no more
problematic favoritism in having the government subsidize sexual activity
than in having the government mandate that private insurance packages
include coverage for contraception, as the PPACA does. Under either
arrangement some citizens are made to defray the costs of other citizens'
contraceptive use, and their doing so is no different-from the standpoint of concerns about government subsidization of certain "lifestyle"
choices-from their defraying healthcare costs stemming from obesity,
accidents incurred through extreme sports, and so on.
56. One might worry that the argument proves too much. If government provision avoids concerns about complicity, why not socialize any
and every program generating opposition from some citizens? Why stop
at contraception? Elective abortions, physician-assisted suicide, and so on
all might be paid for from the public fisc, independent of the beneficiary's ability to pay for the service in question herself.
In response, it bears noting that the foregoing arguments might well
entail government provision not only of contraception but also other elements of the mandated healthcare packages to which a significant number of employers object. If it turned out that enough employers objected
to blood transfusions that exempting them all would undermine the
employer mandate altogether, then it might make sense to have the government provide coverage for blood transfusions. (If, on the other hand,
the number of objecting employers were trivial then, as I have argued, it
would make sense to offer these employers an exemption-assuming that
doing so does not impose undue third-party costs-rather than having
government take over provision completely.)
But government subsidization of elements of the PPACA's mandated
coverage is a far cry from having the government pay for non-Medicaid
elective abortions, PAS, etc. With the contraceptive mandate, the government had already decided that women should have cost-free access to
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contraception. And I have argued that there are good reasons, compatible with political liberalism, for providing contraception at no cost to
the women using it (again, reasons that sound in distributive justice or
theories of public financing for public goods). The distinctive and problematic element arose because the government had also mandated that
private employers help defray contraceptive costs. The predicate for government provision then is that the government has decided-correctlythat citizens should be given no-cost access to a particular good or service
and the question is whether the government should provide it directly. No
such decision has been made about elective abortions for women who are
not Medicaid beneficiaries, or about PAS. So the arguments here do not
in fact lead to the objectionable implications that the worry raises.

